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STUDIES
IN
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
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
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
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NOFORN

The leadership of the Communist world is dominated by men in their late 60s and 70s. Both the collector and the political analyst need to be aware of the ways in which the psychological reactions of advanced age can subtly influence leadership.

AGING COMMUNIST LEADERS: PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Jerrold M. Post, M.D.

Oftener than not the old are uncontrollable; their tempers make them difficult to deal with.

Euripides

A continuing concern in predicting governmental decisions and evaluating the potential for aggressive action by Communist nations is the judgment and emotional stability of the leadership. And currently the Communist leadership is dominated by aging leaders, men in their late 60s or older.

The four ranking Soviet leaders are all in their 70s. Brezhnev is 72, Kosygin 74, Kirilenko 72, and Suslov 76. The average age of the 14 full Politburo members is 67; fully half of the full members are 68 years old or more.

Eastern Europe also has a preponderance of aging leaders. Most prominent is Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, age 86. Both Janos Kadar of Hungary and Erich Honecker of East Germany are 66. Enver Hoxha of Albania is 70. Bulgarian First Secretary Todor Zhivkov is 67; Edward Gierek of Poland is 66, as is Gustav Husak of Czechoslovakia. Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, 61, is the youngest East European chief of state.

The new Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the People's Republic of China is composed, in rank order, of Hua Kuo-feng, Yeh Chien-ying, Teng Hsiao-ping, Li Hsien-nien, and Wang Tung-hsing. China watchers by no means believe that Yeh (80), Teng (74), and Li (71), all veterans of the Long March, have subordinated themselves to the younger and relatively inexperienced Hua Kuo-feng (59). The average age of the 23 full Politburo leaders is 66; more than half are 65 or older.

Other Asian Communist countries have the same preponderance of aging leaders. In the People's Republic of Vietnam, for example, Pham Van Dong is 72; Le Duan, 71; Le Duc Tho 68, Vo Nguyen Giap, 66; and the most senior of the senior citizens, Ton Duc Thang, President of Vietnam, is 90.

Psychological Reactions of Later Life

And so from hour to hour we ripe and ripe, And then from hour to hour we rot and rot, And thereby hangs a tale.

Shakespeare

Perhaps the most important generalization to be made about the intellectual and behavioral capacities of aging individuals is that we can make no wide-ranging generalizations. Some individuals may show significant normal or even "organic" effects of the aging process as early as their 50s, while other individuals may function

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with no apparent decline in their intellectual or creative powers well into their 80s. Particularly if an individual has had a rewarding and self-actualizing career, he may in old age contribute a dispassionate wisdom based on a lifetime's experience. A contemporary example of a leader who performed extremely effectively, indeed often brilliantly, until just before his death at age 78 is Chou En-lai. Yet, ironically, many of his leadership efforts were devoted to moderating the extreme reactions of the aged Mao Tse-tung, whose political leadership was significantly affected by the ravages of age.

Normal Psychological Reactions to Old Age

Even though there may be no evidence of organic deterioration, some of the psychological reactions of an individual in his later years differ qualitatively from those of younger men.

For many, the idea of losing their occupational status may be very threatening, particularly when the career has been extremely rewarding. This often leads to a sense of nostalgia, a tendency to see the present in terms of the past, and to look to the past both for solutions and reassurance. The threat of loss of position and the increasing awareness of failing physical powers may lead some to react defensively and become hyperindependent and preoccupied with demonstrating power and strength.

Though he has watched a decent age go by, A man will sometimes still desire the world.

Sophocles

Time is of the essence. The same ambitions, wishes, feelings, yearnings, and desires that motivated the aging individual when younger are present in his old age. It has been remarked by a specialist in geriatric psychiatry that "old wishes never die; they don't even fade away." Although it is rare for an aged individual to think of himself as old, as he becomes increasingly aware of the ebbing of time he often experiences an increasing urgency to make his mark. He may ask, "What have I accomplished? How much time do I have left?" This perception that time is short tends to become especially pronounced when serious physical illnesses develop.

There may be highly creative consequences of the psychological reactions to the perception that remaining time is short, for an individual may feel impelled to invest his remaining time with significance. This is movingly described by Montaigne:

Especially at this moment, when I perceive that my life is so brief in time, I try to increase it in weight; I try to arrest the speed of its flight by the speed with which I grasp it, and to compensate for the haste of its ebb by my vigor in using it. The shorter my possession of life, the deeper and fuller I must make it.

It is interesting to consider that the principal actors in the current drama in the Middle East, Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menahem Begin of Israel, both have serious heart conditions. It may be that their perceptions that their time is short contributed to their willingness to participate in the creative diplomatic initiatives that began in December 1977.

This sense of urgency in reaction to the perception of diminished time imparts an exaggerated quality to personality needs and drives, so that long-standing personality patterns and pre-existing attitudes appear to be intensified. This is particularly true for individuals from cultures where a premium is placed on youth, ambition, and strength. Old age in such cultures can be particularly threatening.

In contrast, in cultures emphasizing strong family ties, where religious values stress tranquility and wisdom, the aged individual may be revered as a prophet and given a place of honor. In such countries, the approach of death may be accepted with equanimity, and therefore the distorting influence of advancing age upon political behavior may be correspondingly diminished. Chou En-lai is a particularly striking example. He reacted quite stoically to the cancer which ultimately took his life at age 78, and from all outward indications was able to approach the tasks of government with his characteristic good judgment, balance, and intelligence. A current example in the non-Communist world exemplifying the influence of culture on the impact of age is Morarji Desai, the 81-year-old Prime Minister of India, a deeply religious man who sees his election as Prime Minister as an unfolding of his Karma. In contrast to the sense of urgency which impels many Western leaders at the end of their lives, there is almost a complacent lack of urgency for Desai, whose religion teaches him that life will unfold and he will have time to accomplish his God-given destiny. This lack of urgency may interfere with his political efficacy, should he not be impelled to take strong enough measures to attack India's major problems.

Psychological Manifestations of Hardening of the Arteries

There is no one-to-one correlation between age and cerebral degeneration. Many men in their 70s and 80s function at a very high level with little or no impairment to their creative and intellectual capacities, while younger men may show significant interference with their functioning. But once the march of symptomatic cerebral arteriosclerosis or other pre-senile cerebral degeneration has begun, a pattern of "organic" functional disturbance usually follows which can reliably be expected to become more severe.

Rigidity of Thought

Afflicted individuals demonstrate a progressive impairment in their capacity to think abstractly. Thinking becomes more concrete, rigid, and inflexible. There is a tendency to see things in black and white terms as the ability to discriminate nuance and subtle shades of difference diminishes. Responses become less flexible and more stereotyped, so that afflicted individuals are seen as becoming more "stubborn." It is difficult to change a mental set. For a leader suffering from organic brain damage, it might be difficult to stop a plan, once it is set in motion, despite compelling evidence and advice to the contrary. Although there were rational political reasons for many of Mao Tse-tung's moves, in addition to his perception that his time was short, psychological effects of his cerebral arteriosclerosis may well have contributed to the pace of the Cultural Revolution.

Impairment of Intellect and Judgment

There is a general decline of intellectual capacities. Concentration and memory, particularly recent memory, are usually especially affected. There is an associated impairment of judgment. Impulses which had earlier been checked by the restraints of judgment may now be more easily expressed. Thus, an individual may behave more aggressively or be more easily provoked.

Emotional Lability

Emotional reactions in general become less well controlled; afflicted individuals are irritable, easily provoked to anger, tears, or euphoria, and are more sensitive to slight. Depressive reactions are common.

Earlier Personality Reactions Become Exaggerated

As a man grows older, he becomes more like himself.

Anonymous

Aging individuals do not tend to mellow; rather, earlier personality traits tend to intensify. As with the normal aging individuals, the basic personality and life style remain intact, but long-standing attitudes and drives are expressed in an exaggerated way. The characteristically distrustful person may become frankly paranoid. Both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China provide striking historical examples. Always distrustful, Joseph Stalin in his last years was in a clinical paranoid state, blatantly exemplified in "the doctor's plot." Similarly, during the Cultural Revolution, it was striking to observe the number of individuals loyal to Mao from the days of the Long March who fell from his favor and were politically disgraced. (Mao's distrust was not without basis in all cases, for there had been discernible shifts in the loyalty of many of these individuals, partly in reaction to their growing disenchantment with the leadership being provided by the aged Mao.)

Good Days and Bad Days

Afflicted individuals have both good days and bad days. The course of cerebral arteriosclerosis is often characterized by wide fluctuations, but is invariably downhill. For some the decline is very gradual, while for others it may be quite precipitous. **The disparity between observations made on good days and bad days on occasion has led to erroneous conclusions concerning the mental state of the individual.** Thus, if a senior official observed Mao Tse-tung on one of his better days when he was more alert and in reasonably good contact, there would be a tendency to invalidate the reports of poor health. On the other hand, there have been occasions when observations made during a period of particular fatigue or confusion led the observer to underrate the capability of the individual to function. **What is particularly important is to assesss the entire pattern and not to either overrate or underrate the individual's capabilities on the basis of one particular observation.** If one can with some certainty diagnose cerebral arteriosclerosis, even though an individual apparently may be alert on a particular occasion, the other features already enumerated, in particular decline of intellectual abilities and problems with judgments, are nevertheless operating.

Two examples of the possible confusion arising from such apparently contradictory reporting concern Tito and Mao Tse-tung. In April 1975, Tito's health was reported to be gradually getting worse. His condition was said to involve "sclerosis in gradual progression" (probably referring to arteriosclerosis of the brain and heart). But in December 1977, he was observed to be "alert and vigorous," and careful observation revealed no external signs of cerebral vascular disease. Yet again in the spring of 1978, East German sources reported rumors of senility. The other excellent example of this phenomenon is provided by Mao Tse-tung in his latter years, where there was often a wide discrepancy among observations concerning his mental alertness and intellectual acuity. The observations of an apparently healthy and vigorous Tito or a responsive Mao Tse-tung may well have been made on good days and in no way should be taken to invalidate reports of episodes suggestive of hardening of the arteries. (S/NF)

Denial of Disability and "Groupthink"

A particular problem with aging individuals whose capacities have been affected by age is the tendency to deny the extent of disability. When a leader manifests this

denial, it has particular consequences, as it may lead him to grasp the reins of power more tightly at the very time when he should be relinquishing them. On the one hand, the circle surrounding a leader may often be able to insulate him from decision-making responsibilities during periods of extreme disability. But considering the increased suspiciousness, emotional irritability, and denial of disability often characteristic of early symptomatic cerebral arteriosclerosis, it would not be surprising to note that **there would be a natural tendency for the leadership group to foster distorted perceptions of political reality**. If the somewhat suspicious leader becomes frankly paranoid so that "he who is not with me is against me," the subordinate who actively disagrees with his leader may find himself out of a job. Thus some of the psychological qualities of the aging period may promote a sycophantic leadership circle unwilling to upset the leader by disagreeing with him.

It is interesting to speculate on the group influences which may occur when a number of aged individuals as a group determine policy. The group dynamics literature suggests that **individual psychological tendencies may become reinforced and exaggerated in a group setting**, with a tendency to seek solutions that will not strain group consensus. Thus, even though particular individuals might have only subtle signs of the encroachments of age, with only early increases in inflexibility, there may be a summation effect mitigating against individual innovative behavior. If this is so, the judgments and decisions of aging individuals functioning as a group may have contributed to some of the inflexibility of Soviet policy and some of the more regressive policy moves of recent years.

The Example of Leonid Brezhnev

Of the four ranking members of the Soviet leadership, only Brezhnev demonstrates clear signs of the psychological effects of age on his political behavior. In many ways Brezhnev epitomizes both the normal and "organic" effects of the aging process. Although most of the reporting describes Brezhnev as providing effective leadership and for the most part being in control of his intellectual faculties, reports suggesting psychological effects of the aging process are increasing in frequency. There have been significant fluctuations in Brezhnev's condition. During the "down" periods, which tend to occur when he is fatigued or ill, he has demonstrated problems with his concentration and intellectual functions.

Numerous physical ailments have afflicted Brezhnev during recent years, leading some to question whether he is losing his grip. The ouster of Podgorny in May of 1977 caused Kremlin watchers to conclude that Brezhnev was strongly in control. This was a move that had been bruited about for at least five years, but the question remains why Brezhnev felt impelled to act at that time. There were assuredly significant political determinants for this move, but it may be that a contribution to Brezhnev's decision to consolidate his political power was a psychological need to deny his failing physical powers. Psychologically reacting to his internal perceptions of his own failing physical strength, he may have felt impelled to demonstrate that he was strongly in control by increasing his status through securing two of the top three positions.

The recent reshuffling of the Politburo may well be a further example of the same phenomenon. The widespread press reactions were that Brezhnev remained politically strong despite his physical weakness. The *Washington Post*, for example, led off its description of the Politburo move as follows: "Leonid Brezhnev, beset with deafness, flagging energy and other infirmities of age as he nears his 72nd birthday, demonstrated anew last week that his political clout . . . remains vigorous in his 15th year of power." We would again suggest that a contribution to Brezhnev's decision to

consolidate his political power may have been a need to demonstrate he was politically healthy despite his multiple illnesses.

The bulk of Embassy reporting would indicate that Brezhnev is for the most part in control of his mental faculties and capable of providing effective leadership. But there is evidence to suggest that he has difficulties with intellectual conceptualization and intermittent problems with concentration, orientation, and memory. The conceptual difficulties have been noted on a number of occasions during the past several years. A senior Western European diplomat observed that Brezhnev had difficulty synthesizing two related statements into one. Both French and U.S. officials have found that Brezhnev was able to deal with major substantive points, but lacked the mental flexibility to field discussions of detailed issues. (S/NF)

The intermittent problems with concentration, orientation, and memory were striking in their severity at times. In state visits to West Germany and France in 1977 and again to West Germany in 1978, marked difficulties in concentration were observed that had not been previously noted, which led to difficulties in negotiating. French observers found Brezhnev's endurance was quite limited and his attention span short, so he seemed unable to absorb and concentrate on details. A senior U.S. observer noted problems with memory for recent events, which contributed to the appearance of disorientation; the specific details of his schedule often eluded him, and he seemed confused about which days particular events were to occur. (S/NF)

There is variability over time in the level of Brezhnev's functioning. A Canadian observer had the impression that there was a cyclical aspect to Brezhnev's performance. * Following a low period in December-January 1978, during which he was suffering with influenza and pneumonia, he seemed by February to be performing in a normal way, handling well a fairly heavy program. Later that month, Austrian Chancellor Kreisky's impression of Brezhnev was of a tired, very old man, who did not display the demeanor of a man in control of a powerful country. **There may be considerable variability in Brezhnev's functioning during a brief time period.** The May 1978 visit to West Germany epitomizes the variability in Brezhnev's functioning during the prolonged stress of state visits. For the most part, observers were impressed that Brezhnev was providing effective leadership and was fully in control of the Soviet delegation. During his major address, he seemed to lose his mental concentration in several spots. In the discussions which followed his address, he demonstrated good control of his intellectual faculties, although his stamina was fairly limited. Several observers commented that there were numerous indications of his age and relatively poor health. During this visit, Soviet doctors interfered extensively in the meeting arrangements, often stating that sessions had to be shortened or postponed. On the day of Brezhnev's arrival, his condition seemed particularly bad, and his concentration early in the meeting was noticeably troubled, but as the visit went on his concentration improved remarkably. (S/NF)

On a number of nostalgic occasions, Brezhnev has shown easy tearfulness when mourning lost comrades. Although the emotional display may be explained by the nature of the situation and by the emotionality often associated with the Russian national character, such observations have been more in evidence in recent years and are consistent with the emotional reactions of aging individuals.

* This is in part a function of the Soviet political system's cycle. December is the month for accounting for economic performance over the year, and consequently a time of great stress for the leadership. With the completion of this exercise, Brezhnev and other senior leaders traditionally go on vacation. Since 1974, Brezhnev's vacations have always been accompanied by speculations concerning his health.

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The evidence taken *in toto* suggests that age is having both a normal and "organic" psychological impact on Brezhnev. It seems likely that arteriosclerosis causes a subtle interference with Brezhnev's functioning on a continuing basis, not just during the "down" periods. The outlook for Brezhnev, even with the best of available medical care, is for a progressive decline in his intellectual faculties and judgment and increasing difficulties with problem solving requiring fine intellectual discrimination. Difficulties with concentration are likely to increase in frequency and to be especially apparent under prolonged stress. There will continue to be major fluctuations with Brezhnev's condition, with both the frequency and gravity of the "down" periods becoming more pronounced. As physical illnesses supervene, they will add additional stress and compound his problems in bringing full intellectual resources to his leadership.

The Impact of Age Upon the Ranking PRC Leaders

If a family has in its midst an old person it possesses a jewel.

Chinese Proverb

Of the three PRC leaders older than 70, the individual most clearly affected by age is Yeh Chien-ying, 80 years old. His health has been obviously frail for some time, but signs of the effects of age on his mental functioning became apparent only in the past year. Visitors who have met with Yeh have not commented upon significant intellectual deterioration, but several observations do suggest early pre-senile symptoms are occurring.

There have now been three televised occasions when observations of Yeh strongly suggested a decline in cerebral function. Both at Mao's funeral and a year later at the dedication of his mausoleum, Yeh was noted to be confused and disoriented and had to be helped to the appropriate position for protocol purposes. The most persuasive observation was of Yeh delivering an address at the ceremony commemorating the 50th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army. In a strong emotional reaction, Yeh became visibly disturbed, broke into open weeping, and temporarily found it difficult to continue. As in the case of Brezhnev, this was certainly an emotional occasion, but in this case the suddenness and intensity of emotional reaction were quite striking and highly suggestive of the emotional lability associated with cerebral arteriosclerosis.

At the recently concluded Fifth National People's Congress, Yeh was removed from his position as Minister of Defense and elected to the largely ceremonial chairmanship of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. This move may well have been in response to recognition of the fragile state of Yeh's health. But the PRC leadership apparently continues to believe that "with the ancient is wisdom and in length of days understanding," for Yeh was replaced as Minister of Defense by Hsu Hsiang-chien, 76 years old. At the same time, the important post of Minister of the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building, in charge of producing planes and guided missiles for the Chinese Air Force, was given to Sung Jen-chiung, 74 years old.

There have been no clear reports of organic problems with either Teng Hsiao-ping or Li Hsien-nien. Teng, despite his years (73), seems to be extremely agile intellectually and in command of all his faculties. But age may be having its effect psychologically upon him. Teng has always been impatient, but this tendency may be intensifying: a senior observer familiar with Teng's characteristic impatience noted that there seemed to be an increased sense of urgency, that Teng seemed to be "a man

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Aging Communist Leaders

in a hurry." He sensed that Teng's awareness of his age may be impelling him to move the pace of China's modernization along more rapidly than might otherwise be the case. (S/NF)

Implications

One of the most important implications of this paper is implicit in the title. The use of the word *aging* rather than *aged* implies a process. An individual is not in full command of his intellectual resources one moment and senile the next. The traits described in this article are for the most part quantitative rather than qualitative in kind. Easily recognizable when an individual has full-blown cerebral arteriosclerosis, earlier they may be very subtle in their influence, only intermittent in their expression, and detectable only when the observer is actively searching for them. There is probably little dispute at this time that Brezhnev's political leadership has been significantly affected by the inroads of age. But several years ago, when the manifestations were much less obvious, there was considerable controversy as to whether age had reduced Brezhnev's leadership effectiveness, a controversy which to some degree still persists.

With the passage of time, other aging Communist leaders can be expected to show normal psychological reactions to old age as well as "organic" interferences with intellectual equity and judgment as a consequence of cerebral arteriosclerosis. Of particular importance is the interaction between diminished judgment and exaggerated pre-existing attitudes and drives.

It is a rare situation where the influence of age is determinative. But to ignore the impact of age is often to ignore a significant influence on political behavior and decision-making. The challenge, both for the collector in the field and the analyst, is to detect signs that age is affecting political behavior early when the manifestations are subtle and the influence is only slight.

(Classified paragraphs in this article are as indicated.)

Intelligence Vignette

JEFFERSON ADVERTISES FOR A SPY

(from the Historical Intelligence Collection)

" We want an intelligent and prudent native, who will go to reside in N. Orleans as a secret correspondent for 1,000 dollars a year. He might do a little business, merely to cover his real office. Do point out such a one. Virginia ought to offer more loungers equal to this, and ready for it, than any other state."

Jefferson to Madison, 27 May 1793

*Monitoring the health
of Very Important Patients*

REMOTE MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS

Myles Maxfield, Robert Proper, and Sharol Case

Medical intelligence on the health of foreign leaders contributes to the over-all intelligence assessment of the stability of foreign regimes. The most obvious circumstance in which this type of medical intelligence is paramount occurs at the approaching death of the head of state, as in the case of President Pompidou of France discussed below. Less obvious but even more important are situations in which professional medical intelligence can assure our policy makers of the continued survivability and ability to function for a period of time of a foreign head of state who is expected by conventional wisdom to die or become incapable of leading his government. This would be applicable in such cases as Leonid Brezhnev of the USSR, former President Velasco of Peru and Ayub Khan of Pakistan. This type of situation is particularly important at the onset of critical negotiations such as the Camp David Summit of 1978 or the SALT II talks. It sometimes happens that the future course of a regime is influenced by the health of the heir apparent, as was the case with Asfa Wossen, heir apparent to Haile Selassie, and more currently with Edvard Kardelj in Yugoslavia, once heir apparent to President Tito. (S)

The process by which medical intelligence on the health of foreign leaders is prepared includes the collection of raw technical intelligence information (primarily from human sources), the deduction from this information of the past and current medical diagnoses (remote medical diagnosis) of the illnesses of the individual, the prediction of the future course (prognosis) of the illnesses, and finally the estimation of the individual's future ability to function in office. (U)

Remote medical diagnosis is defined as the identification of the illnesses affecting a person without the benefit of a formal medical examination. Its practice today in the United States is largely the province of the medical intelligence officer; it used to be the stock in trade of the average family doctor. It is an extraordinarily difficult task, inadequate and underdeveloped at the present time, and in some ways a lost art. In Arthur Conan Doyle's day it was a maxim that, with careful observation, by the time a patient had entered the doctor's office, greeted the doctor, crossed the room, shook hands and sat down, the physician should have a pretty good idea of the primary diagnosis in fifty percent of the cases. In modern times this type of observation has been almost entirely replaced by much more accurate and discriminating clinical laboratory tests. Who, today, would accept a diagnosis of typhoid fever, kidney failure, diabetic ketoacidosis or advanced cancer made from the distinctive odor of the patient? We shall return to a later consideration of this topic. (C)

In the broader sense, remote medical diagnosis means the identification of the illnesses afflicting a person by a physician who has not himself fully examined the patient. This process is an integral and very large part of medical education today in the form of clinical conferences, grand rounds, clinical-pathological conferences and of course case presentations in the professional medical literature. With almost every patient, in fact, the physician relies heavily upon X-ray, electrocardiographic and laboratory data obtained and sometimes even interpreted by someone else. (U)

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The medical intelligence analyst rarely has the opportunity to examine the person about whom he is concerned and must rely to an exceptionally great extent upon the observations of others. His data are characterized by their incompleteness and by a peculiar nature and mode of expression. His data have the advantage of extending over a long period of time during which most events can be dated precisely, in contrast to a clinical history that depends upon the fallible memory of the patient. These points, as well as other, can best be illustrated through the examination of actual cases. (C)

Georges Pompidou

Georges Pompidou was elected to succeed Charles de Gaulle in 1969. During the 18 months prior to January 1973, he had begun to gain weight and to develop a characteristically puffy face from cortisone treatments. By February, his changed appearance had become sufficiently pronounced that it stimulated the first intelligence reporting that all was not well with Pompidou. By early June 1973, these observations had been amply confirmed; (see Figure 1) photographs revealed the classic facial changes induced by long-term, high-dose cortisone therapy, and several diagnoses including multiple myeloma had been suggested. Finished intelligence was prepared immediately stating that all of the observations were consistent with a diagnosis of multiple myeloma. (S/BUO)

In February 1974, at the request of Dr. Henry Kissinger, we prepared a definitive medical study stating in detail the reasons for believing that the French President's illness was a malignant disease of the blood-forming organs, probably malignant lymphoma, or multiple myeloma. This encompasses a constellation of closely related diseases including Waldenstrom's macroglobulinemia. (S/NFD)

In the absence of any detailed medical intelligence information, the question for remote diagnosis in this case was what disease would cause a highly competent hematologist to prescribe cortisone in massive and toxic doses, along with cobalt radiation and, later, cytotoxic agents. The picture was somewhat complicated by reports that Pompidou had arthritis, for which cortisone might also be used but not in massive, toxic doses. The diagnostic possibilities were quickly narrowed to the group of malignant lympho-proliferative disorders. The study of serial photographs and videotapes contributed significantly to the analysis. It was clear at that point that President Pompidou had an illness that would prove fatal. The appearance of repeated infections and his obviously rapidly deteriorating condition indicated a poor prognosis and he died on 2 April 1974. (S/NFD)

The case of President Pompidou serves to emphasize a number of points and questions:

- President Pompidou's illness probably was diagnosed correctly by his physicians during or shortly after the summer of 1971, although they had probably detected mild non-specific signs of illness at the time he became president. This information was not made public. To what extent should the government of a democracy withhold from its people information concerning the impending incapacity and death of the chief executive?
- While we were unable to make a specific diagnosis with certainty, we were able to narrow the possibilities to the point where it was possible to make a realistic prognosis and describe in some detail the future course of the illness.
- He was severely incapacitated with pain, extreme fatigue, repeated infections and occasional hemorrhages during the last months of his life. He became testy

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Pre-June 1969



May 1973



January 1974

and difficult to work with. During this period, he was clearly unable to manage the affairs of his office with his customary effectiveness. Nevertheless his mind remained clear and he continued work until the very end

- Intelligence reporting, particularly early in his illness, was limited in detail, amount and quality, and we had to rely heavily on auxiliary analytical aids such as photographs. The symptoms of his illness and its treatment were, fortunately for us, susceptible to an analytical investigation of this nature. (S/NFD)

Houari Boumediene

The medical intelligence reporting on President Houari Boumediene of Algeria was of such high quality, so complete and timely (after he returned to Algiers from his hospitalization in Moscow), that the medical intelligence analysts lagged no more than a day or two and often only a few hours behind the thinking of the physicians actually treating him. The scientific and medical complexities lent fascination to this case, which was right at the frontiers of current medical knowledge. Symptoms of his terminal ailment began to appear probably in the spring of 1978 and became markedly worse during the summit meeting in Damascus, 20-24 September, precipitating a sudden return to Algiers where he was hospitalized for study. After a diagnosis of cancer of the bladder and kidney failure was made, he was flown to Moscow for more sophisticated treatment than was then available in Algiers. In Moscow it was soon realized that the case was much more complex. Boumediene was found to have an infection, a kidney disorder, a liver disorder and abnormalities in the biochemical mechanism of his blood clotting which caused him to bleed spontaneously and profusely. A tentative diagnosis of a rare disorder, disseminated intravascular coagulation, was made and therapy started that immediately made his condition worse. (S)

Treatment was therefore discontinued and broader, more penetrating diagnostic studies were initiated that revealed the presence of abnormal proteins (gamma globulins and cryoglobulins) in his blood. A diagnosis of polyclonal gammopathy was made. This is a disease in which certain white blood cells (lymphocytes) of different but closely related types multiply excessively often in response to a chronic infection and produce excessive amounts of specific abnormal serum proteins (S)

At this time Boumediene left the hospital against his doctor's advice and returned to Algiers. He was weak and tired and in a few days developed a severe headache, lapsed into coma and was hospitalized in Algeria with a brain hemorrhage. Algerian physicians found that the abnormal serum proteins were complexes of a single type and diagnosed Waldenstrom's macroglobulinemia with IgM monoclonal gammopathy. Expert medical teams from many countries were called in and a malignant variant of this diagnosis was confirmed. Boumediene's illness had progressed much more rapidly than the classical form of Waldenstrom's syndrome. The disease and a group of closely related ones are sometimes called lymphoproliferative disorders, referring to the rapidly multiplying, sometimes malignant, lymphocytes that produce the abnormal serum protein. The abnormal serum protein damages the blood vessels, kidneys and liver, renders inactive some other substances that enable blood to clot, and destroys the antibodies that repel infection. Treatment was to no avail and he died on 27 December 1978. (S)

This case is presented as one in which a head of state previously thought by his own government and by us to be relatively young and in good health died of illness within three months. This case was so extraordinarily complex medically that medical intelligence analysis, to be satisfactory, had to have available the highest quality of very detailed and timely raw medical intelligence reporting. There is no way that any form of intelligence collection other than expert human reporting could have been adequate to this task. (S)

Leonid Brezhnev

The case of Leonid Brezhnev presents a somewhat different view of VIP medical intelligence. At no single time did we ever have intelligence reporting even remotely as complete and detailed as we have had on the conditions of more accessible world leaders. On many occasions we have had to deal with a considerable amount of spurious medical reporting generated by imperfect observation, false rumors or perhaps by malicious intent. But we have been collecting factual medical data on Brezhnev in some volume for over 20 years. It is possible, with careful medical analysis, to sort these data out, piece them together, and construct a valid and fairly detailed picture of his current medical status. (S)

Brezhnev had a heart attack around 1960. This was of major concern, especially in view of his hypertension and his reputation for heavy smoking and drinking; it may have accounted for his collapse during the Cierna meeting with Alexander Dubcek before the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In 1973 a somewhat fortuitous but very astute personal observation by a medical analyst indicated that he had an intermittent cardiac arrhythmia and that his teeth were in such poor shape that his face was distorted and he could eat only with difficulty. His cardiac pacemaker was installed not long afterward. (S)

This remote observation later helped the medical analysts to avoid two major pitfalls. It was possible to discount a flurry of reports that he had cancer of the mouth. The second pitfall was more difficult to identify. He was reported to have had a stroke, a not unlikely concomitant of hypertension. It was clear from photographs that one side of his face drooped, that one eyelid sagged on occasion, that his speech was slurred and that he had difficulty moving one arm. Careful analysis showed the facial droop and his slurring of words to be due to his dental problems, his drooping eyelid to have occurred for many years and the limitation of movement of his arm to be due to bursitis. (S)

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These are but illustrations of the value of remote diagnosis in elucidating some of Brezhnev's medical problems; it is not intended to be a complete review of his health. Remote diagnosis often produces entirely valid observations but ones that are not normally regarded as symptoms of disease and are therefore difficult to interpret. (S/NFD)

Menachem Begin

Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel had a myocardial infarction in March of 1977. In May and again in September 1977, he had acute attacks of pericarditis (inflammation of the membrane surrounding his heart) that probably represented an allergic reaction to his earlier heart attack. His health has remained quite good since that time although his personality and his medical history of diabetes render him somewhat susceptible to a second and more serious myocardial infarction. His prognosis, though somewhat guarded, is quite good. (S)

We include this very brief outline of Begin's medical history to point out that essentially all of the information available to us has been officially released by the Government of Israel. Medical analysis shows the information to be internally consistent. Still, one must retain some suspicion that the information may be incomplete or inaccurate, especially in view of the fact that only at her death was it revealed that Golda Meir, one of Begin's predecessors, had been fighting malignant lymphoma (a form of cancer) for more than 12 years. We had been entirely unaware that she had this lethal disease.

Sources of Medical Intelligence

Medical intelligence information is derived almost entirely from human reporting, although COMINT makes an occasional valuable contribution. The vast majority of valuable reports are classified. Unclassified reporting such as press ticker, newspapers, radio broadcasts and periodicals are often helpful but are almost devoid of essential detail and may be conflicting and confusing to the medical analyst. Disinformation represents an occasional challenge to the medical analyst but is usually not laid on with skill and depth. (S)

A look into the future prompts a return to the consideration of remote medical diagnosis in the strict sense of determining a person's illnesses by observation from a distance. Whenever possible the medical analyst himself should observe the foreign VIP in person. Direct observation has its primary utility in judging the degree of advancement of a known illness or the extent of disability that it produces. It is also helpful in forming a baseline for future observation and in understanding the characteristics peculiar to that individual that could otherwise be misleading. The case of Brezhnev described above is an outstanding example of the value of direct observation by a medical analyst. (S)

Photography is widely used as a source of medical intelligence but has not yet been exploited to the extent that it should be. Black-and-white still photography is most common. It has the advantages of great detail in each picture and the possibility of comparing many photographs taken over a long time period, as in the case of Pompidou. The usefulness of black and white photography would be increased if photos were obtained in more informal settings, particularly such sporting occasions as golf, hunting, and swimming when attire and postures are more revealing of the subject's physical condition. Photos showing smiles, frowns and similarly pronounced facial expressions are also valuable. Good color photography produces a wealth of

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Remote Medical Diagnosis

additional information but this is generally limited by deficiencies in reproducing true color and in bringing out specific shades in quantitative form. The difficulty of identifying jaundice from a color photograph is an example. Moving pictures and video tapes are useful in determining limitations of motion, unusual motions like tremors or limping, uncertain motions and unusual velocity or extent of motion. Color motion pictures probably have little additional to offer. Stereoscopic photography and holography produce three dimensional reproductions that should prove very valuable in selected cases. Infrared photography can be almost diagnostic in its specificity. Exploitation of other regions of the electromagnetic spectrum is promising but in its infancy. (S)

Voice analysis has been demonstrated to be able to detect the past occurrence of a stroke that is not now apparent on direct observation. Changes in one's voice occur in myxedema and in Parkinson's syndrome and of course with a vocal chord tumor and with respiratory infections. Handwriting analysis also can detect the characteristic micrographia of Parkinson's syndrome. The extensive research required to develop these and other methods of remote medical diagnosis is devoted in part to instrumentation but much more to the analysis of the measurements to determine those characteristic of specific illnesses. There is much to be done to perfect the science and the art of remote medical diagnosis. This has already begun to become urgent as opportunities for human collection become more restricted. (S)

It is not realistic to expect that diagnoses made exclusively from remote observation can ever replace diagnoses made from detailed first-hand medical information collected from human sources. Modern medicine, with its growing array of penetrating physical diagnostic tools such as X-ray, tomography, ultrasound, endoscopy and biochemical tests, is capable of discriminating and following the progress of literally thousands of distinct disease entities that were lumped into relatively few disease groups in the days of Dr. Conan Doyle. Although certain diseases, notably endocrinopathies and some neurological disorders, can often be diagnosed from the appearance and behavior of the affected individual alone, the greatest value of remote observation is in following the progress of a disease whose nature is already known from human collection. (U)

It should be noted that outside of the USSR, few foreign intelligence organizations claim to have any competence in the area of remote diagnosis of foreign statesmen; expertise in this area is severely limited by the constraints discussed above. The importance of evaluating medical incapacity in chiefs of state is obvious, yet the almost total reliance on human collection makes such analyses as difficult as they are intriguing. Despite these constraints, the challenge has been accepted and is being met. (S)

Intelligence Vignette

ON THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE

Modern intelligence has to do with the painstaking collection and analysis of fact, exercise of judgment, and clear and quick presentation. It is not simply what serious journalists would always produce if they had time; it is something more rigorous, continuous, and above all operational—that is to say related to something that somebody wants to do or may be forced to do.

The Economist, 1 October 1966

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*More collection may not be the
way to get better analysis.*

DO YOU REALLY NEED MORE INFORMATION?

Richards J. Heuer, Jr.

The difficulties associated with intelligence analysis are often attributed to the inadequacy of available information. Thus the intelligence community has invested heavily in improved collection systems while analysts lament the comparatively small sums devoted to enhancing analytical resources, improving analytical methods, or gaining better understanding of the cognitive processes involved in making analytical judgments.

This article challenges the often implicit assumption that lack of information is the principal obstacle to accurate intelligence estimates. It describes psychological experiments that examine the relationship between amount of information, accuracy of estimates based on this information, and analysts' confidence in their estimates. In order to interpret the disturbing but not surprising findings from these experiments, it identifies four different types of information and discusses their relative value in contributing to the accuracy of analytical judgments. It also distinguishes analysis whose results are driven by the data from analysis that is driven by the conceptual framework employed to interpret the data. Finally, it outlines a strategy for improving intelligence analysis.

The key findings from the relevant psychological experiments are:

- Once an experienced analyst has the minimum information necessary to make an informed judgment, obtaining additional information generally does not improve the accuracy of his estimates. Additional information does, however, lead the analyst to become more confident in his judgment, to the point of overconfidence.
- Experienced analysts have an imperfect understanding of what information they actually use in making judgments. They are unaware of the extent to which their judgments are determined by a few dominant factors, rather than by the systematic integration of all available information. Analysts use much less of the available information than they think they do.

As will be noted in further detail below, these experimental findings should not necessarily be accepted at face value. There are, for example, circumstances when additional information does contribute to more accurate analysis. There are also circumstances when additional information—particularly contradictory information—decreases rather than increases an analyst's confidence in his judgment. But the experiments highlight important relationships between the amount of information an analyst has available, judgmental accuracy, and analyst confidence. An understanding of these relationships has implications for both the management and conduct of intelligence analysis. Such an understanding suggests analytical procedures and management initiatives that may indeed contribute to more accurate analytical judgments. It also suggests that resources needed to attain a better understanding of

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the entire analytical process might profitably be diverted from some of the more massive and costly collection programs.

Betting on the Horses

Intelligence analysts have much in common with doctors diagnosing illness, psychologists identifying behavioral traits, stockbrokers predicting stock market performance, college admissions officers estimating future academic performance, weather forecasters, and horserace handicappers. All accumulate and interpret a large volume of information to make judgments about the future. All are playing an "information game," and all have been the subject of psychological research to determine how this game gets played.

Experts in these and similar professions analyze a finite number of identifiable and classifiable kinds of information to make judgments or estimates that can subsequently be checked for accuracy. The stock market analyst, for example, commonly works with information relating to price/earnings ratios, profit margins, earnings per share, market volume, and resistance and support levels. By controlling the information made available to a number of experts and then checking the accuracy of judgments based on this information, it has been possible to conduct experiments concerning how people use information to arrive at analytical judgments.


In one experiment,¹ eight experienced horserace handicappers were shown a list of 88 variables found on a typical past-performance chart—for example, weight to be carried; percentage of races in which horse finished first, second, or third during the previous year; jockey's record; number of days since horse's last race. Each handicapper was asked to identify, first, what he considered to be the five most important items of information—those he would wish to use to handicap a race if he were limited to only five items of information per horse. Each was then asked to select the 10, 20, and 40 most important variables he would use if limited to those levels of information.

The handicappers were at this point given true data (sterilized so that horses and actual races could not be identified) for 40 past races and were asked to rank the top five horses in each race in order of expected finish. Each handicapper was given the data in increments of the 5, 10, 20 and 40 variables he had judged to be most useful. Thus, he predicted each race four times—once with each of the four different levels of information. For each prediction, each handicapper assigned a value from 0 to 100 percent to indicate his degree of confidence in the accuracy of his prediction.

When the handicappers' predictions were compared with the actual outcomes of these 40 races, it was clear that average accuracy of predictions remained the same regardless of how much information the handicappers had available. Three of the handicappers actually showed less accuracy as the amount of information increased, two improved their accuracy, and three were unchanged. All, however, expressed steadily increasing confidence in their judgments as more information was received. This relationship between amount of information, accuracy of the handicappers' prediction of the first place winners, and the handicappers' confidence in their predictions is shown graphically in Figure 2. Note that with only five items of information, the handicappers' confidence was well calibrated with their accuracy, but that as additional information was received, they became overconfident.

The same relationship between amount of information, accuracy, and analyst confidence has been confirmed by similar experiments in other fields, especially

¹ Paul Slovic, "Behavioral Problems of Adhering to a Decision Policy," Mimeo, 1973.



clinical psychology.² In one experiment, a psychological case file was divided into four sections representing successive chronological periods in the life of a relatively normal individual. Thirty-two psychologists with varying levels of experience were asked to make judgments on the basis of this information. After reading each section of the case file, the psychologists answered 25 questions (for which there were known answers) about the personality of the subject of the file. As in other experiments, increasing information resulted in a strong increase in confidence but a negligible increase in accuracy.³

A series of experiments to examine the mental processes of medical doctors diagnosing illness found little relationship between thoroughness of data collection and accuracy of diagnosis. Medical students whose self-described research strategy stressed thorough collection of information (as opposed to formation and testing of hypotheses) were significantly below average in the accuracy of their diagnoses. It seems that the explicit formulation of hypotheses directs a more efficient and effective search for information.⁴

² For a list of references, see Lewis R. Goldberg, "Simple Models or Simple Processes? Some Research on Clinical Judgments," *American Psychologist*, 23 (1968), p. 484.

³ Stuart Oskamp, "Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 29 (1965), pp. 261-265.

⁴ Arthur S. Elstein *et al.*, *Medical Problem Solving: An Analysis of Clinical Reasoning* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London), 1978; pp. 270 and 295.

Modeling Expert Judgment

Another significant question concerns the extent to which analysts possess an accurate understanding of their own mental processes. How good is our insight into how we actually weigh evidence in making judgments? For each situation we analyze, we have an implicit "mental model" consisting of beliefs and assumptions about which variables are most important and how they are related to each other. If we have good insight into our own mental model, we should be able to describe accurately which variables we have considered most important in making our judgments.

There is strong experimental evidence, however, that such self-insight is faulty. The expert perceives his own judgmental process, the number of different kinds of information he takes into account, as being considerably more complex than is in fact the case. He overestimates the importance he attributes to factors that have only a minor impact on his judgment, and underestimates the extent to which his decisions are based on a very few major variables. In short, **our mental models are far simpler than we think**, and the analyst is typically unaware not only of which variables *should* have the greatest influence on his judgments, but also of which variables actually are having the greatest influence.

This has been shown by a number of experiments in which analysts were asked to make quantitative estimates concerning a relatively large number of cases in their area of expertise, with each case defined by a number of quantifiable factors. In one experiment, stock market analysts were asked to predict long-term price appreciation for each of 50 securities, with each security being described in such terms as price/earnings ratio, corporate earnings growth trend, and dividend yield.⁵ After completing this task, the analysts were instructed to explain how they reached their conclusions, including a description of how much weight they attached to each of the variables. They were told to be sufficiently explicit so that another person going through the same information could apply the same judgmental rules and arrive at the same conclusions.

In order to compare the analyst's verbal rationalization with the judgmental policy reflected in his actual decisions, multiple regression analysis or some similar statistical procedure can be used to develop a mathematical model of how each analyst actually weighed and combined information on the relevant variables.⁶ There have been at least eight studies of this type in diverse fields,⁷ including one involving prediction of future socioeconomic growth of underdeveloped nations.⁸ The mathematical model based on the analyst's actual decisions is invariably a better predictor of that analyst's past and future decisions than his own verbal description of how he makes his judgments.

Although the existence of this phenomenon has been amply demonstrated in many experiments, its causes are not well understood. The literature on these experiments contains only the following speculative explanation:

Possibly our feeling that we can take into account a host of different factors comes about because although we remember that at some time or other we have attended to each of the different factors, we fail to notice that it is seldom more than one or two that we consider at any one time.⁹

⁵ Paul Slovic, Dan Fleissner, and W. Scott Bauman, "Analyzing the Use of Information in Investment Decision Making: A Methodological Proposal," *The Journal of Business*, 45 (1972), pp. 283-301.

⁶ For a discussion of the methodology, see Slovic, Fleissner, and Bauman, *loc. cit.*

⁷ For a list of references, see Paul Slovic and Sarah Lichtenstein, "Comparison of Bayesian and Regression Approaches to the Study of Information Processing in Judgment," *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, 6 (1971), p. 684.

⁸ David A. Summers, J. Dale Taliaferro, and Donna J. Fletcher, "Subjective vs. Objective Description of Judgment Policy," *Psychonomic Science*, 18 (1970) pp. 249-250.

⁹ R. N. Shepard, "On Subjectively Optimum Selection Among Multiatribute Alternatives," in M. W. Shelly, II and G. L. Bryan, eds., *Human Judgments and Optimality* (New York: Wiley, 1964), p. 266.

**How Can This Happen
To Smart People Like Us?**

In order to evaluate the relevance and significance of these experimental findings in the context of our own experience as intelligence analysts, it is necessary to distinguish four types of additional information that an analyst might receive:

1. **Additional detail about variables already included in our analysis.** Much raw intelligence reporting falls into this category. We would not expect such supplementary information to affect the over-all accuracy of our judgment, and it is readily understandable that further detail which is consistent with previous information increases our confidence. Analyses for which considerable depth of detail is available to support the conclusions tend to be more persuasive to their authors as well as to their readers.
2. **Information on additional variables.** Such information permits the analyst to take into account other factors that may affect the situation. This is the kind of additional information used in the horserace handicapper experiment. Other experiments have employed some combination of additional variables and additional detail on the same variables. The finding that our judgments are based on a very few critical variables rather than on the entire spectrum of evidence helps to explain why information on additional variables does not normally improve predictive accuracy. Occasionally, in situations when there are known gaps in our understanding, a single report concerning some new and previously unconsidered factor—for example, an authoritative report on some policy initiative or planned coup d'état—will have a major impact on our judgments. Such a report would fall into either of the next two categories of new information.
3. **Information concerning the level or value attributed to variables already included in the analysis.** An example of such information would be the horserace handicapper learning that a horse he thought would carry 110 pounds will actually carry only 106. Current intelligence reporting tends to deal with this kind of information—for example, the analyst learning that coup planning was far more advanced than he had anticipated. New facts clearly affect the accuracy of our judgments when they deal with changes in variables that are critical to our estimates. Our confidence in judgments based on such information is influenced by our confidence in the accuracy of the information, as well as by the amount of information.
4. **Information concerning which variables are most important and how they relate to each other.** Knowledge and assumptions concerning which variables are most important and how they are interrelated comprise our mental model that tells us *how* to analyze the data we receive. Explicit investigation of such relationships is one factor that distinguishes systematic research from current intelligence reporting and raw intelligence. In the context of the horserace handicapper experiment, for example, handicappers had to select which variables to include in their analysis. Is weight carried by a horse more, or less, important than several other variables that affect a horse's performance? Any information that affects this judgment affects how the handicapper analyzes the available

data; that is, it affects his mental model. Events in Iran in late 1978 have probably had a permanent impact on the mental models not only of the Iran analysts, but of analysts dealing with internal politics in any of the Muslim countries. As a consequence of Iranian developments, analysts will consciously or subconsciously pay more attention and attribute increased importance to conservative religious opposition movements throughout the Muslim world.

The accuracy of our judgment depends upon both the accuracy of our mental model (the fourth type of information discussed above) and the accuracy of the values attributed to the key variables in the model (the third type of information discussed above). Additional detail on the variables in our model and information on other variables that do not in fact have a significant influence on our judgment (the first and second types of information) have a negligible impact on accuracy, but form the bulk of the raw material we work with. These kinds of information increase confidence because our conclusions seem to be supported by such a large body of data.

Important characteristics of the mental models analysts use vary substantially according to the type of intelligence problem faced. In particular, information is accorded a different role in different types of problems. In analyzing the readiness of a military division, for example, there are certain rules or procedures to be followed. The totality of these procedures comprise our mental model that influences our perception of the overhead photography of the unit and guides our judgment concerning what information is important and how this information should be analyzed to arrive at judgments concerning readiness. Most elements of the mental model can be made explicit so that other analysts may be taught to understand and follow the same analytical procedures and arrive at the same or very similar results. There is broad though not necessarily universal agreement on what the best model is. There are relatively objective standards for judging the quality of analysis, for the conclusions follow logically from the application of the agreed upon model to the available data.

Most important in the context of this discussion is that the accuracy of the estimate depends primarily upon the accuracy and completeness of the available data. If one makes the reasonable assumption that the analytical model is correct, and the further assumption that the analyst properly applies this model to the data, then the accuracy of the analytical judgment depends entirely upon the accuracy and completeness of the data. Because the analytical results are so heavily determined by the data, this may be called *data-driven analysis*.

At the opposite end of this spectrum is *conceptually-driven analysis*. For example, in most political analysis the questions to be answered do not have neat boundaries and there are many unknowns. The number of potentially relevant variables, and the diverse and imperfectly understood relationships between these variables, involve the analyst in enormous complexity and uncertainty. There is little tested theory to inform the analyst concerning which of the myriad pieces of information are most important, and how they should be combined to arrive at estimative judgments. In the absence of any agreed upon analytical schema, the analyst is left to his own devices. He interprets information with the aid of mental models which are largely implicit rather than explicit. The assumptions he is making concerning political forces and processes in the subject country may not be apparent even to the analyst himself. Such models are not representative of an analytical consensus. Other analysts examining the same data may well reach different

conclusions, or reach the same conclusions for different reasons. This analysis is conceptually driven because the outcome depends at least as much upon the conceptual framework employed to analyze the data as it does upon the data itself.

Not all military analysis is data-driven, and not all political analysis is concept-driven. In citing military and political analysis as the opposite ends of this spectrum, we are making a broad generalization that permits many exceptions. In comparing economic and political analysis, we note that economic models are usually more explicit, and that they represent a consensus of at least broad factions within the discipline.

In the light of this distinction between data-driven and conceptually driven analysis, it is instructive to look at the function of the analyst responsible for current intelligence, especially current political intelligence as distinct from longer-term research. His daily work is driven by the incoming reporting from overseas which he must interpret for dissemination to consumers, but this is not what is meant by data-driven analysis. The current intelligence analyst must provide immediate interpretation of the latest, often unexpected events. Apart from his store of background information, he may have no data other than the initial, usually incomplete report. Under these circumstances, his interpretation is based upon his implicit mental model of how and why events normally transpire in the country for which he is responsible. The accuracy of his judgment depends almost exclusively upon the accuracy of his mental model, for he has virtually no other basis for judgment.

If the accuracy of our mental model is the key to accurate judgment, it is necessary to consider how this mental model gets tested against reality and how it can be changed so that we can improve the accuracy of our judgment. There are two reasons that make it hard to change one's mental model. The first relates to the nature of human perception and information processing. The second concerns the difficulty, in many fields, of learning what truly is the best model.

Partly because of the nature of human perception and information processing, beliefs of all types tend to resist change. This is especially true of the implicit assumptions and "self-evident truths" that play an important role in determining our mental models.¹⁰ Information that is consistent with our existing mindset is perceived and processed easily. However, since our mind strives instinctively for consistency, information that is inconsistent with our existing mental image tends to be overlooked, perceived in a distorted manner, or rationalized to fit existing assumptions and beliefs.¹¹ Thus, new information tends to be perceived and interpreted in a way that reinforces existing beliefs.

A second difficulty in revising our mental models arises because of the nature of the learning process. Learning to make better judgments through experience assumes systematic feedback concerning the accuracy of previous judgments and an ability to link the accuracy of a judgment with the particular configuration of variables that promoted an analyst to make the judgment. In practice, however, we get little

¹⁰ We are often surprised to learn that what are to us self-evident truths are by no means self-evident to others, or that self-evident truth at one point in time may be commonly regarded as naive assumption 10 years later.

¹¹ We are, of course, referring to subconscious processes; no analyst is consciously going to distort information that does not fit his preconceived beliefs. Important aspects of the perception and processing of new information occur prior to and independently of any conscious direction, and the tendencies described here are largely the result of these subconscious or preconscious processes.

systematic feedback, and even when we know a predicted event has occurred or failed to occur, we typically do not know for certain whether this happened for the reasons we had foreseen. Thus, **an analyst's personal experience may be a poor guide to revision of his mental model.¹²**

Improving Intelligence Analysis

To the intelligence policy maker seeking an improved intelligence product, our findings offer a reminder that this can be achieved by improving analysis as well as by improving collection. There are, of course, many traditional ways to seek to improve analysis—language and area training, revising employee selection and retention criteria, manipulating incentives, improving management, and increasing the number of analysts. Any of these measures may play an important role, but we ought not to overlook the self-evident fact that intelligence analysis is principally a cognitive process. If we are to penetrate to the heart and soul of the problem of improving analysis, we must somehow penetrate and affect the mental processes of the individuals who do the analysis. The findings in this article suggest a central strategy for pursuing that goal: **this strategy is to focus on improving the mental models employed by the analyst to interpret his data.** While this will be very difficult to achieve, it is so critical to effective intelligence analysis that even small improvement could have large benefits.

There are a number of concrete actions to implement this strategy of improving mental models that can be undertaken by individual analysts and middle managers as well as by organizational policy makers. All involve confronting the analyst with alternative ways of thinking. The objective is to identify the most fundamental analytical assumptions, then to make these assumptions explicit so that they may be critiqued and re-evaluated.

The basic responsibility for proper analysis rests, of course, with the individual analyst. To guide his information search and analysis, the analyst should first seek to identify and examine alternative models or conceptual frameworks for interpreting the already available information. Because people have very limited capacity for simultaneously considering multiple hypotheses, the alternatives should be written down and evidence compared against them in a systematic manner. This permits the analyst to focus on the degree to which the evidence is diagnostic in helping him select the best among competing models, rather than simply the degree to which it supports or undermines his own previous belief. This helps overcome the tendency to ignore the possibility that evidence consistent with one's own belief is equally consistent with other hypotheses. **The analyst must, from time to time, attempt to suspend his own beliefs and develop alternative viewpoints,** to determine if some alternative—when given a fair chance—might not be as compelling as one's own previous view. Systematic development of an alternative scenario generally increases the perceived likelihood of that scenario.

The analyst should then try to disprove, rather than prove, each of the alternatives. He or she should try to rebut rather than confirm hypotheses, and actively seek information that permits this rather than review passively

¹² A similar point has been made in rebutting the belief in the accumulated wisdom of the classroom teacher. "It is actually very difficult for teachers to profit from experience. They almost never learn about their long-term successes or failures, and their short-term effects are not easily traced to the practices from which they presumably arose." B. F. Skinner, *The Technology of Teaching* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1968), pp. 112-113.

information flowing through the in box. It is especially important for the analyst to seek information that, if found, would disprove rather than bolster his own arguments. One key to identifying the kinds of information that are potentially most valuable is for the analyst to ask himself what it is that could make him change his mind. Adoption of this simple tactic would do much to avoid intelligence surprises.

Management can play a role by fostering research on the mental models of analysts. Since these models serve as a "screen" or "lens" through which we perceive foreign developments, research to identify the impact of our mental models on our analysis may contribute as much to accurate estimates as research focused more directly on the foreign areas themselves. When the mental models are identified, further research is in order to test the assumptions of these models. To what extend can one determine, empirically, what are the key variables and how these variables relate to each other in determining an estimated outcome?

Management should insist on far more frequent and systematic retrospective evaluation of analytical performance. One ought not to generalize from any single instance of a correct or incorrect estimate, but a series of related judgments that are, or are not, borne out by subsequent events can be very diagnostic in revealing the accuracy or inaccuracy of or mental model. Obtaining systematic feedback on the accuracy of our past judgments is frequently difficult or impossible, especially in the political analysis field.

Political estimates are normally couched in vague and imprecise terms (to say that something "could" happen conveys no information that can be disproven by subsequent events) and are normally conditional upon other developments. Even in retrospect, there are no objective criteria for evaluating the accuracy of most political estimates as they are presently written. In the economic and military fields, however, where estimates are frequently concerned with numerical quantities, systematic feedback on analytical performance is feasible. Retrospective evaluation should be standard procedure in those fields where estimates are routinely updated at periodic intervals. It should be strongly encouraged in all areas as long as it can be accomplished as part of an objective search for improved understanding, rather than to identify scapegoats or assess blame. This requirement suggests that retrospective evaluation ought to be done within the organizational unit and perhaps by the same analysts that prepared the initial evaluation, even if this results in some loss of objectivity.

The pre-publication review and approval process is another point at which management can impact on the quality of analysis. Such review generally considers whether a draft publication is properly focused to meet the perceived need for that publication. Are the key judgments properly highlighted for the consumer who scans but does not read in depth? Are the conclusions well supported? Is the draft well written? Review procedures should also explicitly examine the mental model employed by the analyst in searching for and examining his evidence. What assumptions has the analyst made that are not discussed in the draft itself, but that underlie his principal judgments? What alternative hypotheses have been considered but rejected? What could cause the analyst to change his mind? These kinds of questions should be a part of the review process. Management should also consider the advisability of assigning another analyst to play the role of devil's advocate.

One common weakness in the pre-publication review process is that an analyst's immediate colleagues and supervisor are likely to share a common mindset, hence these are the individuals least likely to raise fundamental issues challenging the

validity of the analysis. Peer review by analysts handling other countries or issues and with no specialized knowledge of the subject under review may be the best way to identify assumptions and alternative explanations. Such non-specialist review has in the past been a formal part of the review process, but it is not now common practice.

At the policy making level, CIA directors since 1973 have been moving the agency in directions that ensure CIA analysts are increasingly exposed to alternative mental models. The realities of bureaucratic life still produce pressures for conformity, but efforts are made to ensure that competing views have the opportunity to surface. There is less formal inter-agency coordination than there used to be, and increased use of informal coordination aimed more at surfacing areas of disagreement and the reasons therefore than at enforcing consensus.

Sharply increased publication of CIA analyses in unclassified form has stimulated challenge and peer review by knowledgeable analysts in academia and industry. The public debate that followed publication of several CIA oil estimates in 1977 is the most noteworthy case in point. Such debate can only sharpen the perception and judgment of the participating CIA analysts. The 1976 Team A-Team B experiment in competitive analysis of the strategic balance with the Soviet Union, on the other hand, was a miscarriage. Confrontation of alternative mental models is a critical element of the analytical process, but this confrontation must take place in an environment that promotes attitude change rather than hardening of positions.

The most recent development has been the formal establishment in December 1978 of the Review Panel within the National Foreign Assessment Center. The panel, which presently consists of three senior officials from the State Department, the military and academia, is designed to bring outside perspectives to bear on the review of major analytical products.

Conclusion

The function of intelligence is frequently described by analogy to a mosaic. Intelligence services collect small pieces of information which, when put together like a mosaic or a jigsaw puzzle, eventually enable us to see a clear picture of reality. The analogy suggests that accurate estimates depend primarily upon having all the pieces, that is, upon accurate and relatively complete information. It is important to collect and store the small pieces of information, as these are the raw material from which the picture is made; we never know when it will be possible to fit a piece into the puzzle. Much of the rationale for large, technical collection systems is rooted in this mosaic analogy.

The mosaic theory of intelligence is an oversimplification that has distorted perception of the analytical process for many years. It is properly applied only to what has been described as data-driven analysis. A broader theory of intelligence encompassing conceptually driven as well as data-driven analysis ought to be based on insights from cognitive psychology. Such insights suggest that the picture formed by the so-called mosaic is not a picture of reality, but only our self-constructed mental image of a reality we can never perceive directly. We form the picture first, and only then do we fit in the pieces. Accurate estimates depend at least as much upon the mental model we use in forming that picture as upon the accuracy and completeness of the information itself.

The mosaic theory of intelligence has focused attention on collection, the gathering together of as many pieces as possible for the analyst to work with. A more

psychologically oriented view would direct our concern to problems of analysis, and especially to the importance of mental models that determine what we collect and how we perceive and interpret the collected data. To the extent that this is the more appropriate guide to comprehending the analytical process, there are important implications for the management of intelligence resources. There seem to be inherent practical and theoretical limits on how much can be gained by efforts to improve collection, but an open and fertile field for imaginative efforts to improve analysis.

(This entire article is UNCLASSIFIED.)

Intelligence Vignette

ON ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
(from the Historical Intelligence Collection)

Perhaps the first record of economic reporting by an American foreign intelligence agent is that of William Carmichael, who had been dispatched to Holland in late 1776 by Silas Deane, in the guise of a merchant, served as the secret agent in France for the Committee of Secret Correspondence—the foreign intelligence directorate of the Continental Congress. He had tasked Carmichael with a number of economic intelligence requirements, partially reported to the Committee of Secret Correspondence in Carmichael's dispatch from Amsterdam of November 2, 1776. In the report, which went by way of a secret mail facility on St. Eustatia Island, Carmichael reported:

"You have been threatened that the Ukraine would supply Europe with tobacco. It must be long before that time can arrive. I have seen some of its tobacco here, and the best of it is worse than the worst of our ground leaf. Four hundred thousand pounds have been sent here this year."

*A classic pitch for covert action
by one of history's most successful practitioners*

COVERT ACTION, STATE POLICY, AND PUBLIC MORALITY

Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais

*One of the many "universal men" of the Eighteenth Century, Beaumarchais conceived and executed the program by which vital French military aid was funneled covertly to the American colonies during the War of Independence. First, however, he had to win the approval of Louis XVI, who had already turned down the proposals made to him by his foreign minister, the Comte de Vergennes. This article, provided by CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection, is extracted from one of a series of memorials by which Beaumarchais eventually persuaded the king to adopt a covert action program that changed history.**

When Your Majesty disapproves of a plan, it is usual for those responsible for it to defer as a matter of course.

But some projects are so surpassingly important for the well-being of your kingdom that a zealous servant may think it proper to present them to you more than once, lest at first they were not seen in their best light.

The project which I do not name here, but which Your Majesty knows of via M. de Vergennes, is one of these. All I have to get it adopted is the strength of my arguments. I beg you, Sire, to weigh them with all the attention that an affair of this kind deserves. . . .

M. de Vergennes writes to me that Your Majesty believes that it is in the interests of your justice not to adopt the proposed expedient.

Hence the objection rests neither on the immense utility of the project nor on the dangers involved in its execution, but solely on Your Majesty's niceness of conscience.

Such motives for refusal are so worthy of respect that it would be right to condemn oneself to silence and desist forthwith if the extreme importance of the purpose did not make it desirable to study whether it is really in the interests of justice of the King of France not to adopt a like expedient.

Generally speaking there is no doubt that any idea or project that violates justice must be rejected by a man of integrity.

But, Sire, State policy is not the same as private morality. A private person may do no wrong to his neighbor, whatever good may result to him from it, because all men live under the rule of civil and common law, which has provided for the safety of all.

* *Memorial to Louis XVI, December 7, 1775*, quoted in "Beaumarchais: The Man Who Was Figaro," by Frederic Crendel (translated by Roger Greaves), Thomas Y. Crowell Co., New York 1977 (pp. 161-164). For a shorter and eminently readable account of Beaumarchais' role in the American Revolution, see Streeter Bass' article in *Studies XIV/1* Spring 1970, p. 1.

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But a kingdom is a large and isolated body. It is more widely separated from its neighbors by differing interests than by the sea, the citadels and fences that enclose it. A kingdom and its neighbors have no common law to guarantee the kingdom's safety, for relations between a kingdom and its neighbors are dictated solely by the natural law—in other words, they are enjoined on the kingdom by the need to safeguard the well-being and prosperity of every citizen. They have been modified in several ways to form the "law of nations," the essence of which, according to Montesquieu himself, is, firstly, to look after oneself, and, secondly, in so doing to do as little harm as possible to other states. . . .

For the justice and protection that a king owes to his subjects is owed narrowly and absolutely, whereas the justice and protection which he can accord to neighboring states is purely a matter of expediency. It follows that national policy, which maintains states, differs in almost every respect from the civic morality that governs private people. . . .

But, Sire, has there ever been, can there ever be, a single bond between France and Britain that may give Your Majesty pause? . . .

If you are so scrupulous that you do not wish to favour even something that can harm our enemies, how can you, Sire, permit your subjects to vie with other Europeans for the conquest of countries belonging by right to poor Indians, savage Africans, or Caribs who have never offended you? How can you allow your vessels to seize by force and shackle black men whom nature had made free and who are wretched merely because you are powerful? How, Sire, can you suffer three rival powers to carve up the remains of Poland before your very eyes, when your mediation ought to carry great weight in Europe? How can you have a pact with Spain whereby you bind yourself, in the name of the Holy Trinity, to furnish men, vessels and money to this ally to help her wage any war, even an offensive war, the moment she demands your aid, without having reserved so much as the right to investigate whether the war in which you are to be involved is just or whether you are not aiding a usurper? It is not Your Majesty, I know, who did or permitted all these things. They existed before you came to the throne, and they will continue to exist after your reign, for that is the way things go in politics. There are so many examples of this kind that I have simply recalled a few of them to prove to you, Sire, that the sort of politics that upholds nations is different in almost every respect from the morality that governs private people.

If men were angels, we ought no doubt to despise or even detest politics. But if men were angels, they would have no need for religion to enlighten them, or laws to govern them, or magistrates to restrain them, or soldiers to subdue them, and the earth, instead of being a living image of hell, would itself be a region of heaven. But in the end we must take them as they are, and the most just of kings cannot go farther with them than the lawgiver, Solon, who was wont to say: "I have not given the Athenians the best possible laws, but merely those most appropriate to the place, the times and the men I was working for." It follows that politics, though based on very imperfect principles, does at least have a basis. And a king who alone wished to be absolutely just among the wicked and to remain good among the wolves would soon be devoured along with his flock. . . .

Hence I beg you, Sire, in the name of your subjects, to whom you owe your first concern; in the name of the domestic peace to which Your Majesty rightly attaches so much importance; in the name of the glory and prosperity of a reign that began under such favorable auspices—I beg you, Sire, not to allow yourself to fall victim to the

Covert Action

glittering fallacy of false modesty: *summum jus summa injuria* [excessive justice is excessive injustice]. . . .

It is quite impossible to deal in writing with everything that concerns the substance of the affair, since absolute secrecy is necessary. Yet it would be extremely easy for me to show that no risks are involved; that the venture is simple and bound to succeed; and that an immense harvest of glory and repose would result for your reign, Sire, from the sparsest sowing at such an appropriate moment.

May the guardian angel of this State make the heart and mind of Your Majesty favorably disposed towards my plan. If he gives us this first success, all the rest will follow of itself and without difficulty. I guarantee it.

Louis XVI ultimately accepted the broad terms of the plan, directing that it appear that only Beaumarchais was involved in the aid to the emerging American nation. Or, as Vergennes instructed: "The operation must appear to the British government, and even to the Americans, to be essentially a private speculation, which has nothing to do with us. If it is to seem so it must also be so, up to a certain point." The covert action operation provided the Americans with ships and crews, munitions and war materiel, military instructors, and the like, long before France's open intervention on the side of the patriots. Speaking of Beaumarchais' role, one biographer notes: "It was his war, his fleet, his army."

(This entire article is UNCLASSIFIED.)

*A troika may be evolving out of the tug-of-war
with the Pike and Church committees*

CONGRESS AND THE DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS—AN ODD COUPLE?

Donald Gregg

"The CIA has not as a general rule received detailed scrutiny by Congress. . . . Some improvement in the Congressional oversight system would be helpful." (Findings and Conclusions of the Rockefeller Commission, June 1975)

These spare and understated words ushered in a tumultuous period of CIA history. Congressional investigations by the Church and Pike committees in 1975 and 1976 were marked by controversy, confrontation, overblown rhetoric, legal wrangling, and, in the end, a mixture of valuable insights and incorrect inferences. Within the Directorate of Operations the legacy was largely one of organizational weariness and resentment.

Three years have passed since the House, by a two-to-one margin, suppressed the report of the Pike Committee, causing Chairman Pike to refer to his committee's work as "an exercise in futility." The reports of the Church Committee, when formally published, dealt in such detail with assassination attempts, mail openings, drug testing, and other "abuses" that the average reader could well have come away believing that such activities were the rule rather than the rare exception. Senator Church's frequent references to the Agency as a "rogue elephant" also underscored this unfair impression.¹ What has happened in the intervening three years has at times been difficult and painful but still gives hope for a stabilized relationship between Congress and the Directorate of Operations which can allow essential intelligence functions to be carried out with both the understanding and support of Congress.

What follows is an attempt to sketch the Directorate of Operations' perception of oversight as it has changed and developed since 1975.

From the outset, Directorate of Operations personnel suffered the trauma of having total strangers from Congressional staffs ask for some of the Directorate's innermost secrets with the full expectation of receiving comprehensive replies. This experience ran counter to all that had been ingrained in Directorate personnel throughout their careers.

Director William Colby, believing that the Agency had to be more forthcoming in its dealings with Congress, stated clearly that potential embarrassment would not justify withholding information from Congress. He was undeviating in his support for the protection of sources and methods, but believed that accounts of past actions of the Agency had to be made available for Congressional scrutiny and judgment in the light

¹ It is interesting to note in this connection that even the Pike Committee, while biased and inaccurate in its depiction of Agency activities, felt it necessary to take direct issue with Senator Church. The Pike Committee notes as follows: "All evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control, has been utterly responsive to the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs." (CIA, *The Pike Report*, Spokesman Books, 1977, p. 189.) See also "The Rogue Elephant Interred," *Studies* XXII/3, Fall 1978.

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of mid-1970 standards. The years 1975 and 1976 thus formed the most difficult period for the Directorate as a kind of *ex post facto* morality was applied to past operations. These operations had seemed appropriate at the time of their implementation, but a decade or so later could be perceived in quite a different way. The indiscretions and judgmental lapses which typified the Pike Committee investigations compounded the problem. The Directorate frequently was accused of giving as little as possible in response to Congressional inquiries and delaying for as long as possible in doing so. The Directorate, quite naturally, was fearful that its own credibility was being undermined by the sensationalism which colored the early days of the investigations.

Now, as personal relations have developed between staffers of the two designated oversight committees and the Agency officers meeting directly with them, mutual respect, credibility—even friendships—have emerged. But for the average Directorate officer, with no feeling for Capitol Hill and its pressures, requests for information for Congressional committees remain to this day difficult and seemingly thankless chores. Those who may have to spend a large percentage of their time digging out information for a Congressional staff may never see or hear of the benefits which may accrue from their labors. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of all this work has been, slowly, to give Congressional staffs an increasingly accurate view of what the Directorate does, its professional capabilities, its competence, its toughness and the reasons for its parochialism and concern for source protection. This has been a prolonged process and much remains still to be done. Reports in which the Directorate feels it has not been given fair representation by Congress have buttressed those who remain deeply skeptical, if not hostile, toward the oversight process. But reports by oversight committees which the Directorate can regard as fair and balanced have done much to enhance the process.

The fear of leaks has hung over the oversight relationship ever since the entire Pike Committee report was passed to the *Village Voice* after the House of Representatives had voted to keep it secret. The security issue has been one of the most insidious with which the Directorate and its oversight committees have had to deal. Those who leak are seldom if ever identified and the natural tendency, particularly when oversight was in its more confrontational stage, was for each side to blame the other. Today it is accurate to say that the over-all security record of both oversight committees has been very good. This record, as it has continued, has helped to inspire a greater degree of confidence on the part of Directorate personnel in the oversight process. Security remains a problem with other Congressional committees with which the Agency comes in contact from time to time. These committees and their staffs are less experienced in their dealings with the Agency, and are not as sensitized to the need to protect sources and methods. It would be naive, therefore, to assume that leaks are now a thing of the past. But it is fair to say, particularly with regard to the oversight committees, that the problem is receding and that a presumption of trust is developing in its place.

Deep "cultural" differences between the Directorate and Capitol Hill have also retarded the development of a strong oversight relationship. In the intelligence business great premium is placed on clarity and precision in what is communicated and on the need for "getting it right the first time." If a case officer in the field knowingly reports the same piece of information twice, he knows he will be criticized for it. This discipline has caused the Directorate to believe, quite erroneously, that once something has been said, particularly in testimony before a Congressional committee, the subject has been covered and need not be dealt with again. What the Directorate has come to realize only slowly is that members of our oversight

committees have many subjects and personalities competing for their attention, that they may not have had sufficient time to prepare for hearings they attend, that their minds may be on upcoming votes, or that they may not believe that the subjects under discussion are high priority matters. As the Directorate has come to know more of the culture of Capitol Hill, it has been able to approach hearings with a more realistic goal in mind, that of building a textual record which can be pointed to in the future to indicate that the Agency has made available to the Congress the necessary, accurate testimony. The Directorate has also come to recognize that few, if any, members have their minds changed by what is presented at a hearing.

We are also becoming aware that being a member of a Congressional oversight committee is not a highly desirable or sought-after position. Now that the skeletons from the Agency's past have been dug up and displayed a Congressman gains little political benefit or publicity from serving on an oversight committee. In a way, the members become as vulnerable to after-the-fact criticism as the Agency has always been. If Congress claims, as it does now, that it is giving careful oversight to CIA activities, it may then have to share the burdens and the criticisms of future "intelligence failures." Conversely, when something succeeds and is going well, Congress must remain mute. This discipline runs counter to the instincts of elected officials, whose natural tendency is to keep their constituents abreast of their doings, particularly those which reflect credit upon them. It is thus understandable for a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to say "... there is very little political mileage for a Congressman ... it is a thankless task ... you're not getting any brownie points from your constituents ... for all these reasons oversight is a real sonofabitch." (*Inquiry Magazine*, 27 November 1978.)

Travel by members of Congress and members of their staffs to overseas field stations has proven to be the quickest and most effective way of "putting across" what the Directorate does. It has been consistently shown that a day or two in a field station does far more to demonstrate to a Congressman what the Directorate does, how its chiefs of station relate to their ambassadors and what actual operating conditions are than any number of briefings or hearings in Washington. The cumulative effect of Congressional travel has probably done as much as anything to improve both the substance of oversight and the atmosphere in which it is conducted.

While committee members play their more prominent public roles, it is with the committee staffers that the Directorate deals on a daily basis and it is relationships with these men and women upon which oversight stands or falls. Fortunately, both oversight committees have chosen their staffers carefully. Almost without exception they are people of high intelligence with strong and appropriate backgrounds. Many of them appear to have an intrinsic interest in the intelligence business. The staff leadership of both committees is able and experienced, and by and large the reports turned out by their subordinates become increasingly balanced and objective.

From time to time other congressional committees, not having Directorate oversight responsibilities, have developed strong interests in some aspect of CIA's operations. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example, has been concerned about CIA's relations with certain foreign intelligence services. Several committees probing the activities of Korean influence-buyer Tongsun Park also sought information from the Agency. All these activities demand a great deal of time and effort from Directorate personnel and lead to the general impression that Congress may be more deeply involved in Agency affairs than it needs to be. The most pointed example of this was the recently concluded investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) which necessitated the creation of a task force

within the Directorate and consumed thousands of man hours. The staff of the HSCA was in some ways reminiscent of the Pike Committee and there were many instances where immature and unnecessarily abrasive behavior by committee staffers made it extremely difficult for the Directorate to continue cooperation in a spirit of goodwill. (Nevertheless, at the end of its investigation the HSCA made good on its own its agreement to say unequivocally that there was no CIA involvement whatsoever in any aspect of the assassination of President Kennedy.)

As the roles of the two oversight committees grow stronger, the Directorate hopes very much to be able to refer more and more Congressional inquiries to them, thereby cutting down on the number of different demands for information to which the Directorate must respond. As the problems of Koreagate, the Kennedy assassination and CIA's relationship with foreign police services become clarified, it is hoped that the Directorate can deal more and more exclusively with the two oversight committees. Given that some tensions and conflict will remain inherent to the relationship, oversight of CIA by Congress appears to be developing and maturing constructively.

The Directorate, for its part, still needs to make some psychological adjustments. When the Church and Pike Committees were first established, Director Colby virtually decreed that everything would be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. This admonition probably made sense at a time when our relationships with Congress were new, abrasive and confrontational. Questionable acts committed by CIA were coming to light, and each issue which Congress raised was different and had its own volatility.

It was this posture by the Agency which caused Chairman Pike to make the following statement to Director Colby in December 1975:

It has been my experience and judgment that if you (Mr. Colby) are asked precisely the right question, you will give an honest answer. You do not lead us into those areas which would help us know what the right question was to ask. You do not make it easy for us to ask the right question. Anyone who thinks you have been running back and forth to Capitol Hill with briefcases bulging with secrets which you are eager to bestow upon us hasn't sat on my side of the desk.

With the oversight process having matured, a new philosophy has come into being within the Directorate, i.e., to give the oversight committees fair and full responses to their queries, even if a less forthcoming response could be proffered. The rationale behind this philosophy is that unless the Congress has an accurate feel for what the Agency does and how well it does it, it will not be able to represent Agency interests accurately in the vital budgetary process and as charter legislation is discussed in committee deliberations. A part of the new philosophy is also to give both oversight committees the same body of information upon which to base their judgments, even if the committees have asked somewhat different questions. For this philosophy to be fully supported within the Directorate the benefits of oversight must continue to become more visible. This is a hope for the future, and on balance the prospects appear promising.

Another challenge facing the Directorate concerns the ways in which we evaluate our intelligence product as a part of the annual budget exercise. In a time when budgetary allocations are becoming increasingly tight, the intelligence community must learn to do a more credible job in laying out the value of its product. Congress is particularly interested in dollars and cents but often it is not possible to put a price tag on intelligence in terms of dollars saved or disasters averted. The Directorate has

embarked on a systematic process of customer interviews which is already providing the most sophisticated evaluation of intelligence products available to any part of the intelligence community.² More needs to be done in this area if the value of intelligence from human sources is to be understood, and the ability to collect it maintained.


Finally, the people who make up the Directorate of Operations must come to realize that oversight is here to stay and that Congress appears to be dealing with its responsibilities effectively. This will be a difficult adjustment for the Directorate to make. The advent of the intensified phase of oversight is still closely connected in the collective Directorate memory with "the bad old days" in which a few areas of our past record were vilified to such an extent that the over-all record—a source of intense pride to Directorate employees—became obscured.

The Directorate must put the foibles of the Pike Committee behind it. We must come to recognize that the current oversight relationship is one which can help carry the Agency successfully into a new and challenging era where money becomes increasingly scarce and the operational environment grows more volatile. If the Directorate collectively recognizes Congress' "need to know," and if it conducts its difficult work with all the professionalism of which it is capable, oversight can and will work to the ultimate benefit of all concerned.

We have not yet arrived at a fully stabilized oversight relationship, but when one looks back over the past three years, it is evident that a great deal of progress has been made.

(This entire article is UNCLASSIFIED.)

² See "Assessing DDO Human Source Reporting" by Fenton Babcock in *Studies* XXII/3 Fall 1978.



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220 Alcatraz, Cuba, September 1970

*Overhead photography provides
a clue to . . .*

THE CASE OF THE MISSING DIAMOND

Dino A. Brugioni

There is a Cuban saying that if 18 men gather in Cuba you have a good baseball game; if 19 gather you have a revolution.

This interest in baseball manifests itself on aerial photography. The ubiquitous baseball diamonds are an important part of the Cuban landscape, and photo interpreters often gauge the amount of activity by the number of diamonds present in an area.

In 1970 the intelligence community's attention was drawn to a small island in the Cienfuegos area by a sudden upsurge in construction activity. By September the arrival of a Soviet naval task force was causing alarm in some quarters, and the community was tasked with determining whether the new facilities were intended for Cuban or for Russian use.

U-2 photography showed the task force and intensive construction activity which suggested to some that the Russians were establishing a base to support the operations of their nuclear submarines. An antisubmarine net had been placed across the narrow entrance to a naval basin. Two 84-foot special-purpose barges had been brought to Cienfuegos on an *Alligator*-class amphibious ship. There were also additional coastal surveillance radars, new antiaircraft guns, field artillery positions, and the start of construction for a long-range communications antenna.

DCI Richard Helms in his briefing to a Congressional committee covered all the above in detail and then added:

"Finally, new barracks, a pier, and extensive recreation facilities have been built on Cazo Alcatraz. Clinching the case that all this was for Soviet—not Cuban—use, there are sports facilities for soccer, tennis, and volleyball only, and we have yet to see a major Cuban military installation that does not provide for 'beisbol.' "

(This entire article is classified SECRET.)

Letters

COMMUNICATION TO THE EDITOR

As Kurt Vonnegut observed in "Slapstick," "History is merely a list of surprises. It can only prepare us to be surprised yet again."

In the aftermath of the Iranian debacle, the Central Intelligence Agency is in for another spell of flagellation (self-inflicted and otherwise). Having once again been found fallible, it is once again being subjected to bureaucratic dissection. And, one suspects, the results of the dissection will be as unsatisfactory as in the past. This gloomy forecast is based partly on faith that the dynamics of the bureaucratic process will ensure that jobs, turf, and self-respect become the main operative considerations, but more importantly on a belief that any examination which works through the bureaucratic or organizational medium is bound to miss the point. The core of the problem is not organizational but human and perceptual.

Dick Heuer's recent article in *Studies in Intelligence** gives the rest of us—both analysts and policy makers—a lot to chew on. The article argues, it will be remembered, that analysts in retrospect consistently *overestimate* the accuracy of their predictions; but that those who read the analysts' work consistently *underestimate* the ease with which an event could have been predicted. These biases, the article suggests, are so powerful that they cannot be compensated for even by making a conscious effort.

A personal experience seven years ago leads me to suspect that the interaction between analyst and policy maker is even more heavily laden than Heuer's article suggests. I had been roped at the last minute into doing that day's trip downtown with Attorney General John Mitchell's copy of the *President's Daily Brief*. This happened to be the morning after Dom Mintoff (one of the Nixon administration's many *betes noires*) had won a decisive electoral victory in Malta; and Mitchell, who rarely said anything as he leafed through the PDB, muttered past his pipe, "I've never seen you guys call one of these right." As it happened, the previous day's PDB had called Mintoff's election right, but I had failed to read that issue before setting out. So, casting about, I said as brightly as I could, "Well, we called the Allende election right." At which point Mitchell groused, "Then why didn't you do something about it?"

This brief exchange suggests something beyond the obvious strength of Mitchell's biases—a strength that let him blot out what he had read just the day before (the Heuer thesis about readers forgetting what they have learned could hardly be confirmed more vividly). Two other tendencies seem to have been at work. First, distress apparently was transferred from the untoward event to those reporting on it (emotionally, we haven't come too far from the era when the bearer of bad tidings was killed); second, Mitchell seems to have assumed that the Agency should have been able to keep the event from happening in the first place. To Mitchell, then, it was a given that we should come with the ability not just to warn of unpleasant surprises but to prevent them. When we did not (and sometimes even when we did fulfill the warning function), he quickly swung to blanket accusations of ignorance and incompetence.

* "Cognitive Biases: Problems in Hindsight Analysis," *Studies* XXII/2, Summer 1978, p. 21.

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Now, Mitchell was not a man to think in shades of gray. He may be worth looking at, however, simply because his biases show so clearly. To me, at any rate, it would not be surprising if our present policy-making critics turned out to have milder versions of the same patterns: the selective hindsight that Heuer suggests we are all inescapably guilty of, and the wishful thinking about the Agency's omniscience displayed by Mitchell, together with a tendency to swing far to the negative side of the pendulum when the wishful thinking is disappointed.

What can be done about this? Perhaps there is nothing that can be done now, when everyone agrees that the horse is out of the barn and we are all busy nailing the door shut. Indeed (to change the metaphor), perhaps the ritual sacrifices that will now occur are not only predictable but proper for this phase of the exercise. In any case, it would be foolish to hope that the gap between analysts' capacities and readers' expectations can be closed completely: in the end, a policy maker has a right to get angry when he is unpleasantly surprised. But one wonders: there was a time, and it will come again, when our customers could have had pointed out to them that there are some things we do well (at least sometimes) and some we do not; that warning about specific political events comes in the latter category; and that because the political possibilities are always so numerous, because our vision is limited by our humanity, and (not least) because often as not we work by consensus, our batting average in this particular game is not likely ever to be very high. What our readers do have a right to look for is the ability to chart future trends (as we have consistently done for Italy) and help with insights when a crisis comes (as we did during the negotiation of the Panama Canal treaty). Our capabilities, moreover, vary from country to country, from issue to issue, and even from day to day. To make this sort of assertion goes against the *machismo* of bureaucracy, but leveling with policy makers might conceivably leave the Agency better off.

Analysts too could do a better job of leveling. This is harder than it sounds: making it clear how far you are taking the reader and where you are leaving him, without falling into such sins as cop-outs, ass-coverings, etc. As always, analytical somnambulance must be avoided, but so must its equally unhelpful opposite, crying wolf just to be on the safe side. Even now, when there is an overwhelming tendency to call attention to everything that might be a wolf, it is important for the analyst to assert his prerogatives, since analytical integrity is where we will ultimately make (or not make) our marks. Heaven knows there is a lot than we can improve on, and there always will be. (And does the point need to be made that here, too, the problem is not likely to be solved by bureaucratic giant muttering across the abyss to bureaucratic giant?) But sustained analysis is the ground where we will be strongest and, therefore, the most helpful, and this fact should be kept in mind as post mortem hysteria runs its course. (UNCLASSIFIED)

ROBERT S. SINCLAIR

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

THE MOSSAD: ISRAEL'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE: INSIDE STORIES, by *Dennis Eisenberg, Uri Dan, and Eli Landau*. (Paddington Press, Ltd., New York and London, 1978.) 272 pages.

Unfortunately, no competent book exists on the Israeli intelligence structure—a void which is not filled by this work. Essentially a propaganda piece touting the competence of Mossad, Israel's external intelligence service, "The Mossad . . ." warms over some old stories and adds some new concerning the alleged exploits of the "Institution." Ironically, the collection includes operations which, if accurately recorded, were failures, reflected misuse (by our standards) of the intelligence apparatus, or were simply examples of amorality and plain stupidity. The value of the book is directly related to the knowledge of the reader. For that handful who possess sufficient insight concerning the Israeli intelligence structure, the book offers some new material. Others would be well advised to treat it lightly, for they will find fact and fiction most difficult to distinguish.

This problem is intensified by the breezy presentation. There are numerous exact quotations which must for the most part be considered exercises in hyperbole. Unqualified statements are commonplace; they range from gross over-all exaggerations of Mossad's competence to overblown statements about the heroics of the actors. The authors tend to give Mossad credit for activities which are not Mossad's bag. The gaps in the story are notable; especially since the book ignores or touches only superficially on Israeli intelligence activities which might not go over well with an American audience.

So what's worth reading? Some insight is offered into the personality of Isser Harel, the first post-independence head of Mossad. But remember his Germanophobia, his overweening ambition, his petty competitiveness. His faults so badly tarnished his performance that Ben Gurion could no longer continue him in office. As the probable source of much of the raw material in the book, it is not surprising that he comes out rather well. Thus, the Eichmann kidnaping adventure, which is recorded in a manner generally consistent with previously published material, is essentially a summary of Harel's own work, *The House on Garibaldi Street* (A. Deutsch, London, 1975). The published data on this kidnaping is of course essentially from Israeli sources and designed to serve Israeli purposes.

Of passing interest is the account of the rescue of Jossi Schumacher, the child who, because of deep religious differences within Israel, became the center of a politico-religious whirlwind. This episode is also an example of the organizational confusion fostered by this book. The authors, in discussing the search within Israel for the lad, erroneously credit Mossad for an effort that properly fell to the internal service, Shin Beth, and to the police. The ease with which Mossad operated within the United States, assuming the account's accuracy, is worrisome.

The book presents new material concerning the successful 1966 operation in Iraq to obtain a MIG-21 aircraft. Lacking collateral and wary of the author's propensity for

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Books

distortion, the reader should view the account simply as one version of a real and really successful operation. The breach of security, presumably within Mossad, that permitted the authors to prepare this account raises questions concerning Mossad security standards. The account indicates that a primary role was played by an American working unilaterally for Israel.

Eli Cohen's exploits as Israel's spy in Damascus are again recounted here. They are better covered in other published material; for example, "Our Man in Damascus" by Eli Ben-Hanan (A.D.M. Publishing House, Tel Aviv, 1968). The account in "The Mossad . . ." summarizes material published previously but offers nothing new. An effort to present a balanced version of Cohen's life would have required fuller discussion of the Israeli operation to blow up the USIS library in Cairo. The resultant "Lavon Affair" has never, for understandable Israeli reasons, been properly recounted for American readers. Until the 1973 war, it was Israel's worst intelligence blunder. Based on what is in the public domain, the assertion that Cohen was Israel's greatest spy seems warranted. Ironically, Eli Cohen was caught and killed because of egregious and inexplicable shortcomings in Mossad's communications security doctrine.

The authors add some minor tidbits to our knowledge of Wolfgang Lotz, a sad figure who, as an Israeli agent in Egypt, found himself trapped as a consequence of the same operation against the USIS library. His subsequent release, the death of his wife, and his struggle for a new life are recounted sympathetically. We wonder about U.S. procedures which allow a foreign agent who operated against the United States to settle here.

The trip by Meir Amit (Harel's successor as Mossad chief) to the United States just prior to the outbreak of the Six Day War is recounted with notable inaccuracy. Amit made the trip; the remainder must be considered essentially fiction. By contrast, in the next chapter, Harel's downfall is in its essentials accurately recorded (beware, however, of the explanation of the data on German rocket scientists in Egypt). Ben Gurion chose Adenauer's commitment to help Israel over Harel's emotional admonitions against trusting any German. How fortunate for Israel!

The authors avoid discussion of the consequences to Mossad of the Amit succession. Perhaps this gap reflects a desire to avoid denigrating Mossad itself, but an account of Amit's distrust of the second echelon Mossad leadership inherited from Harel and Harel's effort to continue to dominate Mossad from his new advisory position would have given needed substance to the shallow presentation which is offered.

The story of the Cherbourg missile boat operation would not appear to belong in a book about Mossad. Israel's overseas operations cannot effectively be dissected by organization, however, so one should perhaps not be overly concerned that the wrong outfit gets the credit. The Cherbourg affair and the project to purloin Mirage fighter blueprints, exaggerations excepted, were highly successful Israeli operations, but one is again obliged to question the decision to permit declassification of information pertaining to these operations.

The 1961 Israel Beer affair—he was a convicted Soviet agent in Israel—is recounted in a manner which ignores the real issue. The authors barely touch on Beer's membership in MAPAM, a Marxist Socialist Party which at that time was overwhelmingly pro-Soviet. A discussion of Beer's activities could have been used to elucidate the dilemma Israel's leaders felt they faced in deciding where Israel should stand in the world. At the time, many influential Israelis, their views molded by Marxist indoctrination in Russia, sympathized with and had great interest in the

Bolshevik experiment. Indeed, the late Moshe Sneh, one of Israel's ablest early leaders, caused his own ultimate political demise by opting for the Soviet position. But the authors chose neither to explain the case well (it was a Shin Beth, not a Mossad matter) nor to give it the perspective which would have constituted a really useful contribution. And to allege that Beer had full access to classified military information—well, balderdash!

Readers will also be treated to a collection of minor espionage cases. The "spy in the sarcophagus," for example, is an overblown account of a minor Egyptian agent, an Israeli, who allegedly was rescued as he was being transported out of Italy in a coffin. The account of the incident places it in 1974, which is wrong. Another episode discusses briefly a Soviet operation against the Israeli diplomatic installation in Moscow. The Israelis discovered an illicit tunnel into the facility. The connection with Mossad is unclear. A brief discussion of spy ships off the coast of Israel also seems unrelated to Mossad, but American readers will wonder why there is no reference to the inability of the Israelis to identify the *USS Liberty* as an American vessel.

The authors allege that Mossad collected "400 reports" predicting war in 1973 and assert that this intelligence lode failed to convince Israeli analysts of the impending conflict. This may be the worst distortion in the book. In a significant leadership failure, Mossad, up to 1974, never developed an analytical capability worthy of the name. That function lay (and still largely resides) with the military. Mossad was as complacent as its military counterpart in the weeks leading up to Yom Kippur 1973. Four hundred reports?

This book raises several ethical issues. The authors, for example, assert a desire to avoid doing harm to their country's intelligence service. One wonders, however, if the publisher who seems blithely to accept this patriotic gesture is inclined to the same standard in publishing material on U.S. intelligence. The authors also seem totally unconcerned at lynchings of Nazi small fry by Mossad operators (presumably a reference to Mossad's pre-independence precursor) while applauding application of high standards of (Israeli) justice to a big shot (Eichmann). Mossad's assassination operations in the 1970s are barely mentioned and certainly not evaluated from an ethical standpoint (another notably uneven book, "The Hit Team" by David B. Tinnin and Dag Christensen [Little, Brown & Company, Boston, 1976] documented the most notorious killing).

The proofreader who worked this text deserves a bad fitness report. The pagination in the index does not necessarily correlate with the text. You will find, as examples, no reference to George Habbash on page 242 or Israel Beer on pages 213-222.

Perhaps this review catalogs too harshly the shortcomings of a book which, after all, is meant for light reading. But the authors invite such treatment in the preface, which states, "Every story and every incident in this book are true." Humbug!

"Lawrence A. Kane"

(All of the foregoing article is classified SECRET.)

THE JENNIFER PROJECT, by *Clyde W. Burleson* (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliff, N. J., 1978). Photos & diagrams, 179 pages.

In general, exploitation writers assume for themselves a difficult task: usually that of providing instant exposure and/or interpretation of an event from miscellaneous sources of information. When the event of interest is a clandestine intelligence operation, the difficulty of the writer's task is compounded to the Nth degree. Even when intelligence operations are surfaced, usually inadvertently, much or all of the truth remains classified and inaccessible. The writer is then left with such resources as media accounts, access (often illegal) to program participants, and perhaps now-identifiable cover stories. The result is often neither a novel nor a history, but an amalgam—separate elements are brought together, but not blended to become a new whole. No suspense or intrigue of a novel, no fascination of the real truth. Mr. Burleson's book is such an amalgam. (U)

"The Jennifer Project" purports to be the inside story of the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* project. Sixteen chapters later there is no real evidence to support this claim. The author switches between narrative descriptions, asides, and retrospectives to tell a story about this unique intelligence operation. Every possible facet of the program is dealt with in turn: basics of Soviet submarine technology; U.S. anti-submarine detection and warfare; a scenario for the accident to the G-class submarine (target of the operation); the Soviet search; genesis of the JENNIFER (sic) project; Glomar technology, management and operations; the intelligence take; and termination of the program. These program-related aspects are interspersed with segments on the American political atmosphere of the times, Howard Hughes, and the history of U.S. espionage. (U)

A few examples will illustrate the fictional and rehash aspects of this book. On page 92, Mr. Burleson indicates that there was a final test of the lift capacity using a load of 12,800,000 pounds suspended for two weeks. No such load was applied to the total system until the operation. In fact, in a post mission study the Survey and Investigation Staff of the House Appropriations Committee criticized the program manager for not conducting this type of test. In the real world of the actual program, there was a conscious decision not to perform such a test due to technical, cover, cost and security factors. (S)

Mr. Burleson's discussion of the intelligence take and its exploitation is dated and shows no sign of "insider" access. For example, he observes: "On one subject eyewitnesses and the unofficial CIA release do agree: the retrieval of a vast array of papers and documents, including pin-up pictures from several of the Soviet seamen's lockers." Compare this with Lloyd Shearer's version published in PARADE, 11 May 1975: "It learned something about the Soviet standards in metallurgy and welding, the station assignments of the sub's personnel; and the type of pin-ups the sub's personnel collected." (U)

The book is not worth a reviewer's or a reader's time. There is very little in it that was not either previously written as speculation by the press, or made available to the public as part of the process to dispose of the ship after the operation. It would take excessive space to compare Mr. Burleson's book with the actual program on a facet-by-facet basis. (U)

(Paragraphs in this article are classified as indicated.)

John Milligan

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SUB ROSA: THE CIA AND THE USES OF INTELLIGENCE, by *Peer de Silva*. (The New York Times Book Co., Inc., New York, 1978.) 308 pp.

This book is not what its sub-title suggests. Although he may have aimed at presenting a "current and honest picture" of how the CIA works and operates "abroad and at home," what the author has turned out is instead another readable and generally serviceable memoir of the Cold War career of a senior officer of the Clandestine Service. Published shortly after his death last year, the book chronicles the highlights of Peer's Agency career that followed his World War II duties as a Regular Army security officer with the Manhattan Project, during which he accompanied the first A-bomb on its delivery to the Enola Gay's base on Tinian. After post-war Russian language training with the Army in Germany, and a brief stint on the Helsinki-Moscow courier run, Peer joined the Agency in 1949 as [] in Munich. His field assignments thereafter included tours [] in Vienna, Seoul, Hong Kong, Saigon, [] and [] in San Francisco. Less frequent headquarters tours included stints with SR Division and the Foreign Intelligence Staff (which he headed in 1969-70) and as the prototype National Intelligence Officer—as Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs (SAVA) to DCI Raborn in 1965-66.

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These varied assignments involved Peer in a broad spectrum of clandestine intelligence activities, often at key posts at critical junctures in the Cold War. In the first half of his career, his work focused on the Soviets and Central Europe, at a time when operational techniques and tradecraft were being developed and tested in an active field environment. Peer helped to plan and supervise attempts at bugging diplomatic meetings, inducing defections, protecting friendly operations against hostile services, working with liaison services, and exploiting the heavy flow of refugees from the Hungarian uprising. His "second career" took him to the Far East, where he became intimately familiar with political intelligence, military coups, fruitless China operations, and counterinsurgency activities in Southeast Asia.

Peer characterizes his work with the Clandestine Service as "often petty, humdrum, and dull," but not without "some excitement, danger, and death." The former he encountered in San Francisco, where he was "bored beyond belief," and presumably also in Hong Kong and Canberra, about which he has little to say. He experienced his share of excitement, however, escaping injury in a shooting incident in Vienna in the early 50s, but losing the sight of one eye when Communist terrorists abruptly ended his Saigon tour by exploding a bomb alongside the American Embassy. In addition to these dramatic episodes, the book includes a number of operational anecdotes depicting some of the kinds of activities in which he was involved. These are, for the most part, interesting, well-written, and collectively give some feel for the flavor of clandestine work abroad in the 50s and 60s.

Partly because the selection of anecdotes is limited, the picture is not comprehensive, and its effect is further diluted by a tendency to tilt at windmills, to flail dead horses, and to engage in simplistic and righteous preaching. For example, he fumes at some length about the futility of parachuting agents into the Soviet Union, which continued into the early 50s. He lines up unequivocally against the CI Staff, whose "doctrinaire, and faulty, bias . . . for many years caused grievous harm to our intelligence work abroad." With respect to human rights in Korea, he asserts flatly that

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the "style of the Pak government was appropriate to the time and necessary to the conditions of Korean history." On Vietnam: "Fundamentally, we lost because we were prideful, arrogant, and dumb . . . The American homefront rejected the war because we were clearly losing it, without any prospect of winning." Obviously, there is more that could and should be said on each of these highly controversial issues, but the author simply lets his biases hang out without serious discussion of the pros and cons. His account of how he developed an essentially overt relationship with Rhee's Vice President—John Chang—has an oddly triumphal tone. Finally, while taking credit for having obtained one report in 1960 on the impending military coup by Pak Chung Hee, Peer fails to mention the extent to which the station, the embassy, the Agency, and official Washington were caught unawares when the coup took place.

Vietnam receives more attention than any other aspect of the author's career. He correctly puts great stress on the psychological importance of Viet Cong terrorism in advancing the Communist cause in the countryside. But he misses the opportunity to suggest that intimidation at the international level—and of the U.S. populace—may have been the real aim of the "Tet Offensive"—the supreme terrorist act of the Vietnam war. Peer details his discovery of the station's innovative contributions to counterinsurgency operations in the early 60s, and the losing battle that he and the station fought to keep these programs from being emasculated through militarization. "During 1964 and 1965 the CIA station . . . happened on a formula . . . (combining) local Vietnamese armed force and civic action, coupled with psychological indoctrination which was increasingly proving itself able to promote local security for villages and hamlets and which made it reasonable for the farmers in the countryside to cooperate willingly with the Vietnamese Government grassroots program . . ." Peer describes how this program, the "best chance we and the Vietnamese ever had," was doomed when it was transferred to military control, and the motivational indoctrination was cut back to accelerate the expansion of the program.

The author is predictably critical of Secretary McNamara, "who never understood the war," of Ambassador (General) Maxwell Taylor, "who came to the wrong war" in 1964, and of General Westmoreland, "honest, courageous, but intellectually uninspired and short on imagination." Acknowledging the importance of good working relationships between an ambassador and his chief of station, Peer admits to spotty relationships with Ambassadors Llewellyn Thompson and Henry Cabot Lodge. He gives good marks to Ambassadors Freeman Matthews, a tennis buddy, and Graham Martin, whom he applauds for standing up to military pressures in Bangkok in 1966-67. The only DCI evaluated is Admiral Raborn, whom Peer found to be "a pleasure to work for—courteous, calm and very sharp."

Despite its limitations, I would recommend the book to new generations of operational employees, not as a textbook, but as background reading in the lore of the way things were in clandestine operations abroad. In his epilogue, Peer asked rhetorically whether the "years of effort and hard work" were "really worthwhile, and was anything accomplished?" Although he professes pride in his years in the clandestine service, he doesn't answer the question directly. Hopefully, someone will soon write an articulate response which will appropriately justify the toil, sweat, blood and treasure expended on clandestine operations over the past quarter century. Meanwhile, Peer's rationale for having an effective U.S. intelligence service is relevant—if metaphorical: "There are tigers roaming the world, and we must recognize this or perish."

George W. Allen

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